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Compensation for Electricity Consumers  
Under a U.S. CO2 Emissions Cap 
Anthony Paul, Dallas Burtraw, and Karen Palmer 
Abstract 
Policies to cap emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the U.S. economy could pose significant 
costs on the electricity sector, which contributes roughly 40 percent of total CO2 emissions in the U.S. 
Using a detailed simulation model of the electricity sector, we evaluate alternative ways that emission 
allowances can be allocated. Most previous emissions trading programs have allocated the major portion 
of allowances for free to incumbent firms. In the electricity sector this approach would lead to changes in 
electricity price that vary by region primarily based primarily on whether prices are market-based or 
determined by cost-of-service regulation. Allocation to customers, which could be achieved by allocation 
to local distribution companies (retail utilities) would recover symmetry in the effect of free allocation 
and lead to signficiantly lower overall electricity prices. However, this form of compensation comes with 
an efficiency cost that will increase the overall cost of climate policy. 
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Compensation for Electricity Consumers Under a U.S.  
CO2 Emissions Cap  
Anthony Paul, Dallas Burtraw, and Karen Palmer ∗ 
1 Introduction 
A crucial decision in the design of a cap-and-trade program for CO2 is the initial 
distribution, or allocation, of emission allowances. The creation of a market for CO2 
emissions would involve the largest distribution and enforcement of new property rights 
in North America in over a century, and the decision about allocation has efficiency and 
distributional consequences. The economics literature finds significant efficiency 
advantages to the use of an auction rather than free distribution of emission allowances. 
One reason is that an auction is administratively simple and precludes regulated parties 
from seeking a more generous future allocation. Another is that free allocation in 
competitive markets, like some markets for electricity in the United States, can move 
consumer prices away from the marginal cost of production and therefore distort resource 
allocation in the wider economy away from the efficient optimum. Compared with other 
approaches, an auction helps maintain transparency and the perception of fairness, and it 
leads to more efficient pricing of goods in the economy, which reduces the cost of the 
policy. These are important principles for the formation of a new market for an 
environmental commodity. 
Most previous programs have relied on free distribution rather than an auction. 
Generally speaking, free allocation of allowances gives interested parties strong 
incentives to argue for an ever-increasing share of emissions allowances. In contrast, 
many authors suggest that auctions reduce rent-seeking, which occurs when regulated 
parties invest resources in trying to affect the outcome of an administrative process that 
distributes allowances freely. One particularly insidious aspect of free allocation is the 
adjustment to allocation rules for new emissions sources and for old sources that retire. 
The sulfur dioxide (SO2) trading program in the United States has no adjustments for 
these sources, which is a virtue because it does not create incentives for investment 
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behavior to deviate from what is otherwise efficient. However, most other trading 
programs have such adjustments. In the NOx budget program in the United States, for 
example, individual states determine the allocation of allowances; most have set-asides 
for new sources, and sources that retire lose their allocations. Adjustments also are 
ubiquitous in the EU Emission Trading Scheme. The problem with such adjustments is 
that they alter the incentives for investment and retirement in a way that can lead to 
unintended consequences. For instance, there is evidence that as a result of adjustments to 
allocation rules for new sources in the EU, the value of emissions allowances can bias 
investment toward higher-emitting generating sources. This bias can result from the value 
of the subsidy embodied in free allowance allocations. Furthermore, the removal of 
allocations from sources that retire provides a financial incentive to continue the 
operation of existing facilities that are often inefficient and that otherwise would retire, 
except for the value of the allowances that they earn by remaining in operation. The use 
of an auction avoids this predicament entirely.1  
The second, and equally forceful, reason that economists favor the use of auctions 
is that they generate funds that can be used to help reduce the cost of policy. For the 
purposes of minimizing the cost of climate policy on the economy and promoting 
economic growth, the economics literature has focused on dedicating the use of revenue 
from an auction to reduce preexisting taxes. Like any new regulation, climate policy 
imposes a cost on households and firms; that cost acts like a virtual tax, reducing the real 
wages of workers. This hidden cost can be especially large under a cap-and-trade 
program because the price placed on the scarcity value of carbon is reflected in the cost 
of goods that use carbon in their production, which are ubiquitous in the economy. 
However, the revenue raised through an auction (or an emissions tax), if dedicated to 
reducing other preexisting taxes, can reduce this cost. This so-called revenue recycling 
would have substantial efficiency advantages compared with free distribution.2   
A compelling justification for free distribution of emission allowances is that 
public policy should do “no direct harm” through changes in government rules and 
regulations.3 This justification has been invoked to argue for free allocation to firms, in 
order to soften the impact of the policy. However, consumers rather than firms or their 
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shareholders may be the most adversely affected by climate policy. Consequently, 
compensation for consumers has become a central element of the political dialogue about 
climate policy in the United States, which is made even more salient by recently 
increasing fuel prices. This paper looks at the effect on consumers from climate policy 
and approaches to compensating consumers.  
We focus exclusively on the electricity sector. Although the electricity sector is 
responsible for about 40 percent of CO2 emissions in the United States, most models 
indicate that under a cost-effective program, two-thirds to three-quarters of emission 
reductions in the first couple decades of climate policy are likely to come from this 
sector. Consequently the electricity sector is a very special case; it constitutes the heart of 
any proposal to implement market-based approaches to achieving CO2 emission 
reductions. All of the important existing trading programs include the electricity sector, 
and usually they exclude other sources. In the United States, the sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
trading program, which began in 1995, and the nitrogen oxide (NOx) trading program, 
which began in 1999, each has a pool of emission allowances with annual value of $1–3 
billion and focus on the electricity sector almost exclusively. The EU Emission Trading 
Scheme (ETS), which began in 2005, includes major point sources, of which the 
electricity sector constitutes the most significant portion. In addition, the ten-state 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which will be the second mandatory cap and 
trade program in the world for CO2 beginning in 2009, covers just the electricity sector. 
Previous analysis of the electricity sector relying on detailed simulation modeling 
indicates that on an industry-wide basis only 6 percent of the allowance value created 
within the electricity sector (2.5 percent overall) is sufficient to hold the industry 
harmless because the majority of costs are recovered by changes in product prices.4 
General equilibrium models with less information about the structure of costs and 
production within the sector have found results that are broadly comparable. One study 
found that most of the economic effect of climate policy would be felt in the oil, gas, and 
coal industries, which could be compensated with just 19 percent of allowance value.5 
That paper found that the most important downstream industry to be compensated is the 
electricity sector, but that it would be much less affected than the primary fuel sectors. 
                                                 
4 Burtraw and Palmer, 2008.  
5 Bovenberg and Goulder (2001) considered the effect of a constant $25 allowance value sufficient to 
achieve emissions reductions of 18 percent in the long run.   4
Another study estimated that the reduction in equity value in the electricity sector would 
be equivalent to 6 percent of the total allowance value.6  
Although harm to producers may be concentrated and visible to the politicians, 
consumers in the electricity sector would incur a loss approximately eight times as great 
as that of producers (Burtraw and Palmer 2008, U.S. EIA 2005). Consequently, the 
political economy of climate policy in the United States invites some form of 
compensation for consumers, at least as a transition to full implementation of CO2 
allowance auctions. 
The obvious way in which compensation for electricity consumers can be 
achieved is through free allocation of emission allowances. Emissions allowances 
represent enormous economic value—tens of billions of dollars annually under a federal 
carbon policy—that arises due to the value placed on emissions within a cap-and-trade 
system. Paltsev et al. (2007) put the possible annual auction revenue at $130–$370 billion 
by 2015, an amount equivalent to $1,600 to $4,900 per family of four. The initial 
distribution of just a portion of the valuable emissions allowances represents a significant 
potential source of compensation. The enormous value of the allowances makes this 
high-stakes issue perhaps the greatest political challenge in designing climate policy. 
This paper highlights the important role that market organization and regulatory 
institutions in the electricity sector play in affecting the efficacy of climate policy. 
Specifically, the regulatory setting plays a crucial role in determining whether free 
allocation will effectively deliver compensation to its intended recipients. The U.S. 
electricity sector is split so that about one-third of the electricity consumed from the 
power grid is sold at market-based competitive prices and the other two-thirds are sold 
under cost of service regulation.7  
As mentioned above, one virtue of an auction is the possibility to direct revenues 
to purposes that reduce overall cost. Another virtue applies specifically to the electricity 
sector. In regulated regions, compared with free allocation, an auction approach tends to 
reduce the difference between price and marginal production cost for electricity 
generation—a source of inefficiency that is endemic to the electricity industry.8 Within a 
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partial equilibrium model, the efficiency gains from using an auction in regulated settings 
can be at least as great as the gains from revenue recycling in a general equilibrium 
context.9 
This paper incorporates the mechanisms of electricity price formation under 
competitive and regulated electricity markets in a detailed simulation model to 
investigate the magnitude of the effects that can be anticipated from alternative methods 
of allowance allocation within the electricity sector. We examine the effects on 
consumers under an auction of allowances, and under grandfathering – free distribution 
to incumbent electricity-generating firms. We contrast these approaches with three 
allocation schemes that are primarily aimed at compensating consumers. These all 
involve allocation to local distribution companies, the retail companies that deliver 
electricity to customers. The prices that these entities charge for electricity distribution 
are regulated throughout the United States and local distribution companies have been 
identified in legislative proposals as potential trustees to act on behalf of customers with 
respect to the allocation of emissions allowances. Various proposals have suggested 
allocation to local distribution companies be done on the basis of population, emissions 
or consumption.  
Free allocation of emissions allowances to consumers or generators diverts 
revenues that otherwise could be dedicated to general tax relief, which offers efficiency 
gains and forms broad-based compensation for the diffuse effects of the policy on 
households. Free allocation also diverts revenues from other purposes, such as research 
initiatives or energy efficiency programs linked to climate policy. In the electricity sector 
free allocation also moves electricity price in regulated regions further away from 
marginal cost. Policymakers need to be cognizant of likely impacts on all affected parties, 
and they may want to limit and narrowly target free distribution of emissions allowances 
to better address a broader set of efficiency and compensation goals. 
2  Analysis of the Electricity Sector 
The electricity sector deserves special attention not only because of the emission 
intensity of its product, but also because of the long-lived nature of capital and the 
idiosyncratic way in which electricity markets are organized. Regulation of generation 
and retail services are generally left to states. However, because electrons flow freely 
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over the wires and across state lines, the transmission grid is regulated by the federal 
government. The way that most states choose to regulate generation and retail services 
typically differs, and the choices vary across the states. 
2.1 Institutions 
Economists tend to think most markets are fundamentally competitive, at least in 
the long run. As a general principle, in competitive markets free allocation to firms will 
not benefit consumers because the economic value of a commodity in a competitive 
market is determined by its scarcity. Emissions allowances are a valuable asset, and as 
long as there is a liquid allowance market, a firm can sell allowances at the market price 
instead of using them for its own compliance responsibilities. The firm will recognize the 
lost opportunity for revenue from the sale of an allowance each time it uses the allowance 
itself for compliance. So in most markets economists would not expect to see consumers 
receive the benefit from free allocation to firms. Instead the value of emission allowances 
would be captured by shareholders who, in turn, would recognize their opportunity cost 
in production decisions. 
The fact that a firm in a competitive market will charge its customers for the use 
of an asset that the firm has received for free is often a difficult idea for people to grasp, 
but it is wholly consistent with economic theory and it is in general what is observed in 
empirical studies. Indeed, sometimes economists seek evidence of noncompetitive 
behavior and “market power” by looking for instances when the price of a good differs 
from the cost of factor inputs used in its production. An emissions allowance in a cap-
and-trade program is one such factor. If a firm did not pass through the cost of an 
allowance in the pricing of its product, it would be prima facie evidence of a 
noncompetitive market—and of possible market manipulation.  
However, a substantial portion of the electricity sold in the United States is not 
traded in competitive markets, but instead sold in markets that are subject to cost-of-
service regulation. In these cases regulators set prices to allow firms to recover their 
costs, which are usually calculated on an original-cost basis. If allowances are received 
for free by regulated electricity generators, then the addition to the cost basis for the 
purpose of cost recovery is zero. Roughly speaking, this situation applies to about two-
thirds of the electricity customers in the country. In these areas the benefit of free 
allocation to emitters or producers can be expected to be passed on to consumers.    7
The contrast between regions with market-based electricity prices and regulated 
prices could yield asymmetric changes in retail electricity prices under free allocation to 
firms. These asymmetric effects on electricity consumers, in which free allocation to 
producers benefits consumers in regulated regions of the country, but not those in regions 
with market-based prices, introduce a challenging dilemma to climate policy. 
An alternative approach to compensation is allocation to local distribution 
companies (LDCs), the retail electricity companies that deliver electricity to customers 
and that could be directed to act as trustees on behalf of consumers. Although retail 
companies would see the cost of power in the wholesale power market increase under a 
cap-and-trade program, they would have substantial allowance value to rebate to 
consumers, and this would reduce the cost impact for their customers in competitive and 
regulated regions alike. Virtually the entire country is regulated in retail services, and 
some recent proposals, including the Lieberman–Warner climate proposal (SB 2191), 
would allocate some fraction of allowance value to LDCs for compensation to electricity 
consumers through rate reductions. This approach is expected to have the advantage of 
maintaining symmetry on a regional basis in the electricity sector.  
2.2 Model 
Several features of the market determine the relationship between CO2 allowance 
price and the electricity price (Reinaud 2007). The most important are the fuel use, the 
portfolio of generation technologies, the nature of economic regulation and market 
structure, and the approach to allocation. To analyze these relationships we rely on a 
detailed simulation model of the electricity sector known as the Haiku Electricity Market 
Model, which is maintained by Resources for the Future. Haiku is a deterministic, highly 
parameterized model that calculates information similar to the National Energy Modeling 
System used by the Energy Information Administration, and the Integrated Planning 
Model developed by ICF Consulting and used by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). The Haiku model is distinguished from these models by its capacity to 
evaluate policy effects on consumer and producer surplus in the electricity sector and 
express these as a measure of economic welfare within the national and regional 
electricity markets.  
The Haiku model simulates equilibrium in regional electricity markets and 
interregional electricity trade with an integrated algorithm for emission control 
technology choices for SO2, NOx, mercury and CO2. The composition of electricity 
supply is calculated using a fully integrated algorithm for capacity planning and   8
retirement coupled with system operation in temporally and geographically linked 
electricity markets. The model solves for electricity market equilibrium in 21 Haiku 
market regions (HMRs) within the continental United States. Each of the 21 HMRs is 
classified by its electricity pricing regime as having either competitive or regulated 
electricity pricing, as shown in Figure 2.2-1. Electricity markets are assumed to maintain 
their current regulatory status throughout the modeling horizon; that is, regions that have 
already moved to market-based pricing of generation continue that practice, and those 
that have not made that move remain regulated. The price of electricity to consumers 
does not vary by time of day in any region, though all customers in competitive regions 
face prices that vary from season to season.  
 
Figure 2.2-1 Haiku Market Regions and Electricity Pricing 
 
Each year is subdivided into three seasons (summer, winter, and spring-fall) and 
each season into four time blocks (superpeak, peak, shoulder, and base). For each time 
block, demand is modeled for three customer classes (residential, industrial, and 
commercial). Supply is represented using model plants that are aggregated according to 
their technology and fuel source from the complete set of commercial electricity   9
generation plants in the country. Investment in new generation capacity and the 
retirement of existing facilities is determined endogenously in a dynamic framework, 
based on capacity-related costs of providing service in the future (“going forward costs”). 
Operation of the electricity system (“generator dispatch”) in the model is based on the 
minimization of short-run variable costs of generation. 
Equilibrium in interregional power trading is identified as the level of trading 
necessary to equilibrate regional marginal generation costs net of transmission costs and 
power losses. These interregional transactions are constrained by the level of the 
available interregional transmission capability as reported by the North American Electric 
Reliability Council (2003a, 2003b).10 Factor prices, such as the cost of capital and labor, 
are held constant. Fuel prices are benchmarked to the forecasts of the Annual Energy 
Outlook 2007 for both level and elasticity (U.S. EIA 2007). Coal is differentiated along 
several dimensions, including fuel quality and content and location of supply; and both 
coal and natural gas prices are differentiated by point of delivery. The price of biomass 
fuel also varies by region depending on the mix of biomass types available and delivery 
costs. Other fuel prices are specified exogenously. 
Emissions caps in the Haiku model, such as the Title IV cap on national SO2 
emissions, EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule caps on emissions of SO2 and NOx, and the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) cap on CO2 emissions, are imposed as 
constraints on the sum of emissions across all covered generation sources in the relevant 
region. Emissions of CO2 from individual sources depend on emission rates, which vary 
by type of fuel and technology, and total fuel use at the facility. The sum of these 
emissions across all sources must be no greater than the total number of allowances 
available, including those issued for the current year and any unused allowances from 
previous years when banking is permitted. In this analysis, banking for CO2 is not 
enabled. Rather, year-specific emission targets are taken from the Energy Information 
Administration analysis described below, to which the simulations are calibrated. This 
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approach allows for a more transparent comparison of the effects of different approaches 
to allocation because the quantity of emissions in each year is held constant.  
3 Scenarios 
One way that electricity consumers can be compensated directly is for each 
citizen to receive allowance value directly. This approach has recently been described as 
“cap and dividend” because the allowance value would be refunded as a dividend on a 
per capita basis. This approach would be among the most progressive in its distributional 
consequences (Burtraw et al. 2008; Boyce and Riddle 2007). The Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities (2007) identify another approach that would take advantage of 
information about household income to target the most disadvantaged households using 
just a portion of the allowance value.  
Environmental advocates typically take a different view, however, aiming to 
direct auction revenue to complementary initiatives to reduce emissions. For example, the 
Model Rule for the 10 northeastern U.S. states in RGGI specifies that each state must 
allocate at least 25 percent of its budgeted allowances to a consumer benefit or strategic 
energy purpose. These “consumer benefit” allowances are to be sold or otherwise 
distributed to promote energy efficiency, to directly mitigate electricity ratepayer 
impacts, or to promote lower-carbon-emitting energy technologies. (Most of these ten 
states have indicated their intention to auction nearly 100 percent of their budgeted 
allowances.) Ruth et al. (2008) found the dedication of 25 percent of the allowance value 
to investments in end-use efficiency would offset any increase in retail electricity price 
from the policy. A similar plan to direct a portion of allowance value to strategic energy 
purposes is part of the European Commission’s proposal for moving to an auction in the 
EU ETS beginning in 2013. The merits of this strategy rest on the belief that there exist 
market barriers that prevent the realization of opportunities for improving efficiency in 
the end-use of energy or to bringing renewable energy sources to market. The merits rest 
as well on the ability to design institutions that can use allowance value effectively to 
overcome these barriers. Other claims for allowance value are based on the need to 
accelerate the adaptation to climate change. Atmospheric scientists tell us that we are 
already at the point where some climate warming is inevitable and that adaptation will be 
necessary. Adaptation will involve significant investment by the private and public 
sectors. An auction provides revenues that could be directed to this variety of purposes. 
The scenarios we model are limited to the electricity sector, but they capture the 
heart of the debate regarding treatment of allocation for that sector in the United States.   11
The allowance distribution plan for Lieberman–Warner (S 2191) dedicates 22 percent of 
the allowances in the year 2012 to states in one fashion or another.11 One major portion is 
directed to electricity local distribution companies (9 percent) and natural gas distribution 
companies (2 percent). These allocations are intended to address a variety of purposes 
including promotion of investment in end-use efficiency or direct rate relief for 
customers. Other proposals have been even more aggressive.12 The Jeffords bill in 2002 
would have allocated two-thirds of emissions allowances to the states for determination 
of ultimate allocation by trustees. It would be plausible for this decision to be left to the 
state public utility commissions, who would act as trustees on behalf of consumers. 
3.1  Alternative Methods for an Initial Distribution of Emissions 
Allowances  
The Lieberman–Warner proposal includes a cap-and-trade system for the entire 
economy with point of compliance at upstream fuel supply in almost every case. In 
general, the policy would require fuel suppliers to surrender allowances equal to the 
carbon content of the fuel and byproducts that they sell or consume in their refining and 
manufacturing processes. The exception is coal-fired power plants, which would have 
compliance responsibility at the point of consumption. For natural gas use in the 
downstream electricity sector the cost of the cap-and-trade system would be perceived as 
a change in the relative cost of fuel. Fuel with relatively high carbon content would be 
expected to have a higher price because of the opportunity cost of emissions allowances 
that fuel suppliers would have to surrender to bring that fuel to market. For coal-fired 
power plants the cost of power would depend on the method of allocation and the type of 
regulation in place. 
In general, it is vital to recognize that the point of allocation of emissions 
allowances is distinct from the point of compliance. We evaluate several methods for the 
initial distribution of emissions allowances (Sterner and Muller 2007). One alternative is 
upstream allocation, with all emissions allowances distributed initially to fuel suppliers 
and with no allowances distributed to the electricity sector. Within the electricity sector, 
this approach is equivalent to an auction regardless of how the allowances are actually 
distributed to fuel suppliers because electricity generators purchase their emissions 
allowances bundled along with their fuel through an increase in the price of fuel.  
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As one alternative to an auction, we consider free distribution of allowances to 
incumbent firms in the electricity sector on the basis of historic measures of electricity 
generation. This approach is often called grandfathering because it distributes 
allowances without charge to incumbents in the industry. Another approach, which we do 
not explore here, is to regularly update the calculation underlying the allowance 
distribution based on current- or recent-year data. Like distribution based on historic data, 
an updating approach distributes allowances free of charge and also could distribute them 
according to various measures, such as the share of electricity generation or heat input (a 
measure related to fuel use) or a share of emissions at a facility (Burtraw et al. 2001; 
Fischer and Fox 2004; Rosendahl 2008). An updating approach leads to lower electricity 
prices than an auction or historic approach and is expected to have greater social costs 
because it does not provide the same incentive through higher prices for consumers to 
improve the efficiency of energy use (Burtraw et al. 2006). 
The focus of this analysis is the modeling of allocation to local distribution 
companies, the retail companies that directly serve customers. This approach is described 
as “allocation to load” or “load-based allocation” because in one form or another it 
would allocate to customer demand for electricity (load). We model this at the level of 21 
regions in our model, and based on three different metrics. One is the portion of 
electricity consumption in each region, a second is the portion of population and the third 
is the portion of emissions. These metrics are calculated on a one-time basis, drawing on 
the baseline model run for each simulation year in the model. The value of emissions 
allowances under allocation to load is used to offset the average cost of electricity 
directly, for example by offsetting the transmission and distribution charge. Although 
electricity prices vary by customer class because of varying time profiles of demand and 
different shares of transmission charges assigned to each class, we assume a uniform 
distribution of the value of allowances in reducing electricity price across all customers. 
3.2   Baseline 
The baseline scenario is constructed to incorporate all major federal legislation 
governing airborne emissions from the electricity sector including Title IV and CAIR for 
SO2 emissions, the annual and ozone season caps on emissions of NOx under CAIR, and 
CAMR for mercury emissions. Also included are some state level legislation, including 
RGGI, and other policies that are specific to individual states. For nuclear capacity 
additions, Haiku uses the regional output of the EIA National Energy Modeling System   13
for 2007 as capacity limits on new construction of nuclear plants. All of these potential 
capacity additions are east of the Mississippi River (U.S. EIA 2007). 
Two of the most important baseline scenario assumptions are the treatment of 
Federal Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit (REPTC) and of state level Renewable 
Portfolio Standards (RPS) in several western states, including California. The REPTC 
provides a production tax credit of $19/MWh to new wind, geothermal, and dedicated 
biomass generators, and a credit of $9.50/MWh is available to new landfill gas and non-
dedicated biomass generators.13 Since the federal REPTC has repeatedly been renewed 
just prior to lapsing and has actually lapsed three times for a total of 16 months (over the 
15 years since it was initially instituted) before being reinstituted, it is modeled in 
perpetuity in Haiku as a tax credit that is received with 90 percent probability. The state 
level RPS mandates within the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) region 
require substantial increases in renewables generation in the coming years. The resulting 
capacity additions are not modeled endogenously within Haiku. Instead, we force new 
renewable capacity into our model in order to meet these standards in the western states14 
according to forecasts provided by Energy and Environmental Economics, Inc (E3).15 
These forecasts of renewable resource additions include the planned capacity additions 
for wind, geothermal and biomass reported by the Transmission Expansion Planning 
Policy Committee (TEPPC) along with additional resources that E3 forecasts would be 
needed to meet RPS standards. These renewable policies are significant because of their 
potency in reducing emissions, but also because by including them in the baseline it 
reduces the cost of achieving a specific emissions cap under the policy scenario.  
3.3 Policy  Scenario 
The emissions reduction targets that we model are taken from the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration modeling of the Lieberman–Warner proposal (U.S. EIA 
2008). From that modeling we take the CO2 emissions determined at the national level as 
given, and we assume it is not affected by small changes in the electricity sector that 
result under the variations of policies we model. We do not allow inter-annual banking in 
the runs of our model, although it is implicit in the quantity targets we take from EIA. 
                                                 
13 All values are reported in 2004$ unless indicated. 
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Montana, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Nevada and Wyoming. 
15 “Electricity and Natural Gas GHG Modeling: Methodology and Key Revisions,” Slides 38-39, April 21, 
2008; <http://www.ethree.com/GHG/E3_CPUC_GHG_21April08.pdf>.   14
Investment and operational decisions in our model respond to this fixed emission target. 
In reality (as opposed to in the model), the electricity sector decisions would play a role 
in the determination of the electricity sector’s share of national emissions that obtain 
under each policy scenario, but we maintain the fixed quantity to achieve comparability 
across scenarios. Since the emission quantity is the same and the models are different, our 
model will result in a different level of allowance price and electricity price across 
scenarios and different from that obtained in the EIA exercise.  
In addition to the no-policy baseline, five policy scenarios are modeled. These are 
comprised of an allowance auction, free allowances to incumbent generating firms 
(grandfathering), and the three allocation-to-load scenarios described above, based on 
consumption, population and emissions. 
4 Results 
The effect of climate policy on electricity consumers depends on several factors 
that vary by region of the country including the fuel mix and technology used for 
generating electricity, economic regulation and the approach to allocation. Moreover 
these factors interact. For example, the portfolio of generation technology determines the 
fuel that is used at the margin at different times of day and year, and the economic 
regulation in the region determines whether changes in average or marginal cost 
determine changes in electricity price. This analysis focuses on the role of allocation, but 
highlights the important interactions among all these factors, particularly how different 
approaches to allocation can have different effects depending whether markets are 
regulated. 
If allowances are allocated upstream or auctioned to electricity producers, the 
opportunity cost of the allowances would be reflected in the price of electricity in both 
regions with competitive electricity markets and regions subject to cost-of-service 
regulation. We find that if allowances are allocated for free to generators on the basis of 
historic generation, the effect on electricity prices and thus on consumers would depend 
on whether electricity markets are regulated or not. Allocating allowances to local 
distribution companies would largely erase these inter-regional differences based on 
regulation, with remaining differences across regions being largely a function of the mix 
of resources used to generate electricity within a region.   15
This modeling exercise was performed for a horizon beginning in 2010 and 
ending in 2025. For expositional simplicity this paper focuses on the results obtained for 
the year 2020. 
4.1  Allowance Allocation and Consumers 
The quantitative effect of different approaches to allowance allocation on average 
electricity prices is shown in Table 4.1-1. The table reports price effects in each Haiku 
market region as well as aggregate price effects aggregated into regions defined by 
geography and by regulatory institutions. The auction has the biggest effect on electricity 
prices in both types of regions and nationwide. Prices in competitive regions increase by 
$8.50 per MWh with an auction, while in regulated regions the increase in average price 
due to the policy is closer to $6 per MWh. The difference is related to the differences in 
resource mix between the two types of regions and the difference in regulation. Under 
cost-of-service regulation, allowance costs from an auction are passed through to 
consumers in a way that makes the generators whole and thus these costs are averaged 
over all MWh sold. However, in competitive regions, the allowance cost to the marginal 
generator is passed through in the market-determined price that is charged for all 
electricity, which may be generated with an emitting technology or a non-emitting 
technology at any point in time. Many generators, particularly those with substantial 
reliance on non-emitting technologies like nuclear or hydro, will earn rents from this type 
of pricing (Burtraw and Palmer, 2008). Nationwide the price increase under an auction 
averages $7 per MWh.16 
When allowances are grandfathered to generators based on historic generation the 
inevitable effect of the policy is an electricity price reduction in regulated regions relative 
to the auction scenario. This reduction leads to increased consumption of electricity, more 
power imported from neighboring competitive regions and a resultant increase in the 
electricity price in the competitive regions relative to the auction. Relative to the baseline, 
competitive regions will see an increase in electricity prices of nearly $10 per MWh 
under grandfathering, while regulated regions will actually experience a small decline in 
prices of $1 per MWh. The decline in prices is made possible by the disconnect in 
                                                 
16 This price effect is difficult to compare directly with the EIA analysis. US EIA (2007) models a mixed 
allocation of some auction, some free allocation. Also they do not model the continuing availability of the 
REPTC, even on a probabilistic basis. Further, the EIA analysis of an economy-wide policy will have 
broader effects in primary fuel markets, especially with respect to the change in demand for natural gas and 
resultant price change. The demand response we capture is only that pertaining to the electricity sector. US 
EIA finds the change in electricity price to be $4.7/MWh (2004$).   16
regulated regions between marginal and average costs. Marginal costs will rise by nearly 
$10 per MWh, but average costs will fall as a result of the displacement of relatively 
carbon intensive generation resources in the baseload part of the supply curve with less 
carbon intensive resources, especially subsidized renewable resources. This also allows 
for the profitable export of grandfathered allowances. Nationwide the price increase 
under grandfathering will be roughly one-third of what it will be with an auction. 
Table 4.1-1. Change in Electricity Price by Region and Allocation Method in 2020 (2004$/MWh)  
Region Auction  Grandfathering  Load-Based 
(population) 
Regulated Regions  6.1 (1.0)  (0.0) 
Competitive Regions  8.5 9.9 1.8 
National  7.0 2.7 0.6 
   
The asymmetric consequence of grandfathering emission allowances is illustrated 
in the first two panels of Figure 4.1-1, which illustrates the distributions of price changes 
across regions under different allocation approaches. The graphs in this figure provide 
histograms of the frequency of various levels of electricity price change resulting from 
the cap and trade policy under different allocation approaches. The horizontal axis in 
each graph indicates the size of the change in electricity price while the vertical axis 
indicates the number of billion kWh of electricity consumption that experience each level 
of price change from the policy. Changes associated with regulated and competitive 
regions are indicated in contrasting shading. 
The top panel of the figure shows how electricity prices change in 2020 in 
response to a climate policy with an allowance auction. Under the auction we see that the 
average change in electricity price nationwide is roughly $7 per MWh with impacts in 
particular regions varying between $1.80 and $10.60 per MWh. This graph shows that 
there is much overlap between price impacts in regulated and competitive regions under 
this policy. The main differences in the distribution of the change in price result from the 
fuels and technologies used to generate electricity in each region. There remain important 
differences between regulated and competitive regions in the rates at which compliance 
costs are passed through to customers as changes in electricity prices because of the 
difference in average and marginal cost pricing. However, the difference among regions 
under an auction, and hence the explanation for the distribution of the change in costs 
across regions, is fundamentally driven by the change in the emission intensity of   17
electricity generation. The middle panel of the graph shows the distribution of price 
effects across regions under grandfathering. This figure illustrates the dramatic difference 
between regulated regions and competitive regions. In regulated regions, consumers 
benefit from a grandfathering approach and price increases are much reduced. As shown 
in appendix Table 1, in two regions, Indiana and a region spanning Kentucky, West 
Virginia and a small part of Virginia, prices actually fall by roughly $7 and $9 per MWh, 
respectively, while several other regions experience price declines of between $0.20 and 
$1.80 per MWh. In competitive regions the distribution of price impacts actually shifts 
slightly to the right, reflecting the increase in generation costs associated with the 
increase in demand (due to the lower price) in regulated regions, compared to an auction. 
The biggest price increases occur in Pennsylvania (PA) and the region that includes Ohio 
and Michigan (OHMI). 
The asymmetry in price effects under grandfathering between regions under 
different pricing regimes has posed one of the major political challenges to the design of 
climate policy in the United States. While a point of departure for policy design from the 
perspective of the electricity industry has been free allocation of emission allowances, 
analysis has informed industry members of their opposing interests, depending on what 
kind of region they are in, and increasingly consumer interests have taken notice. The 
emerging attention being given to load-based allocation is potentially one way for the 
industry to navigate these issues.  
Compared to an auction, load-based allocation attenuates price increases from 
climate policy in both competitive and regulated regions. As a point of departure, we 
consider first LBA on the basis of population. In practice this would be implemented by 
initially apportioning allowances to the service territories of individual retail utilities, or 
more probably to states and charging state public utility commissions to complete the 
apportionment to service territories. In our model, this is implemented by apportioning 
allowances among the 21 market regions according to population. Table 4.1-1 indicates 
that in competitive regions the price increase from the policy falls from $8.50 per MWh 
with an auction to $1.80 per MWh with the load-based allocation approach. In regulated 
regions, the average price of electricity is unchanged under the climate policy with load-
based allocation compared to the baseline. Nationwide electricity price increases by 
$0.60 per MWh. In general, load-based allocation dramatically reduces the effect of the 
policy on consumers in both competitive and regulated regions relative to the auction 
scenario. 
   18
Figure 4.1-1. Distribution of Electricity Price Effects in 2020 
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The bottom panel of Figure 4.1-1 illustrates this effect in a histogram that can be 
compared with the other approaches to allocation. To a rough approximation, load based 
allocation restores the symmetry in the price impacts on regulated and competitive 
regions that would be observed under an auction, albeit at much lower levels. This has 
made load-based allocation increasingly popular to overcome political opposition to the 
effect of climate policy on electricity prices. 
Giving allowances away for free will help to soften the impact of the policy on 
consumers, but it will do so at a cost. By reducing prices, the load-based allocation 
approach and, for consumers in regulated regions, the grandfathering approach, mute the 
incentive to conserve electricity that exists with an auction. The effective subsidy to 
electricity consumption causes generation to be higher, leading to a higher demand for 
CO2 allowances. This results in an increase in allowance price, which will spread 
throughout the economy under an economy-wide cap-and-trade program. Allowance 
prices in 2020 under the different allocation approaches are reported in Table 4.1-2. The 
table indicates that allowance price in 2020 rises from $14.10 per ton CO2 under an 
auction to $15.30 under grandfathering and even higher, to $15.80, under a load-based 
approach. 
Table 4.1-2. National CO2 Allowance Price in 2020 (2004$/ton)  
Auction Grandfathering  Load-Based 
(population) 
14.1 15.3  15.8 
 
4.2  Different Flavors of Load Based Allocation 
In a second set of simulation runs we consider three alternative bases for 
determining a region’s load-based allocation of emission allowances. Previously we 
considered total population in the region, and in addition we consider total electricity 
consumption and total emissions from electricity generation.17 Under load-based 
allocation based on population, heavily populated regions would receive a greater share 
of the allowance value than less populated ones. In comparison, the consumption-based 
approach would tend to favor consumers who reside in regions where electricity 
                                                 
17 The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (April 21, 2008) call for load-based 
allocation on the basis of historic emissions.   20
consumption per capita is higher and the emissions-based approach would favor 
consumers in coal-intensive regions. The emissions-based approach introduces a more 
prominent role for the resource mix in the determination of each region’s share of 
emission allowances, as occurs with grandfathering, except in this case the benefits of 
free allocation in both regulated and competitive regions accrue to consumers instead of 
to generators. 
Varying the basis for allocation to local distribution companies from population to 
another measure will have different effects on electricity prices in different regions. 
Appendix Table 2 shows some of the factors underlying those differences. For example, 
both Northern (CALN) and Southern California (CALS) have low consumption per 
capita and conversely relatively high population per unit of consumption relative to many 
other regions in the model, and thus would receive a larger share of emissions allowances 
under a population-based allocation than a consumption-based approach. A population-
based approach would produce a more substantial price reduction, especially in Northern 
California, which has a low rate of electricity consumption per capita.18  An emissions-
based approach also would not be favorable for California, which has a relatively clean 
portfolio of generators. In contrast, a coal-intensive region such as the one including 
much of Kentucky, part of Virginia and West Virginia (KVWV) has relatively high CO2 
emissions per capita and thus consumers in that state are expected to find an emissions-
based approach to allocation to be more favorable. 
To provide a summary of these different regional effects we aggregate the 21 
Haiku market regions into six regions: 
•  Northeast states in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
•  Southeast 
•  Midwest and Appalachia 
•  Plains 
•  Rocky Mountains and Northwest 
•  California 
The composition of each region is shown in the map displayed in Figure 4.2-1. 
                                                 
18 Note that the measures of electricity consumption per capital reported in the table include total 
consumption by all classes of customers in the state divided by total population.   21
Figure 4.2-1 Aggregated Regions 
Table 4.2-1 reports the regional electricity price changes in 2020 under the three different 
approaches to load-based allocation. The last row of the table reports the average price 
changes for the nation as a whole and shows that varying the basis for load-based 
allocation does not have much impact on average electricity price nationwide. Under all 
three load-based scenarios national average electricity price rises by less than a dollar per 
MWh, which is substantially less than the price difference resulting under an auction. 
However, this apparent similarity masks some substantial differences across regions. 
The biggest difference in price effects across the different load-based approaches 
occurs in California, where allocation to local distribution companies based on population 
yields an average electricity price that is $8.50 below baseline levels (e.g. price actually 
falls under the climate policy) while an allocation based on emissions yields a price that 
is $3.10 above baseline levels, on par with the price increase experienced under 
grandfathering.  If allocation to local distribution companies is based on electricity 
consumption, the average price is also lower than in the baseline, by $3.60.   22
Table 4.2-1. Change in Electricity Price by Region and Approach to Load-Based Allocation in 
2020 (2004$/MWh)  






RGGI  (1.4) 2.0  5.3 
Southeast  0.6 (0.8)  (0.3) 
Midwest and Appalachia  4.2 3.5 0.5 
Plains  2.3 1.5 0.0 
California  (8.5) (3.6)  2.9 
Rockies and Northwest  (2.6) (2.2) (2.1) 
Competitive  1.8 2.7 2.6 
Regulated  (0.0) (0.6) (0.7) 
National  0.6 0.6 0.4 
   
 
  The second biggest differences in price effects across the three load-based 
allocation scenarios are found in RGGI. Electricity consumers in the RGGI states would 
clearly be better off when allocation is based on population and average price is $1.40 per 
MWh lower than in the absence of a climate policy. Under the consumption-based 
allocation to local distribution companies, prices in the RGGI states increase by $2 per 
MWh. Consumers in this region are least well off under an emissions based approach, 
which produces average price increases under the policy of $5.30 per MWh. Some parts 
of this region experience substantially higher price increases; in northern New England, 
which relies heavily on hydro and nuclear power, average electricity prices will increase 
by $9.20 under the emissions-based approach. 
The only region to experience price increases under all three load-based 
approaches is the Midwest and Appalachia. In this region average price rises by $4.20 in 
the per capita scenario, driven in large part by even bigger increases in coal-rich 
Kentucky and West Virginia. When emissions are used as the basis for allocation to load, 
the average electricity price rises by only $0.50. However, this increase masks large 
declines in price in the states of Kentucky, West Virginia and Indiana that are offset by 
price increases in the region that combines Illinois and Wisconsin, which has a fair 
amount of nuclear generation. Customers in the plains states also experience price 
increases larger than the national average under the population and consumption based   23
approaches. However, average price remains virtually on par with baseline levels under 
the emissions based approach. 
Our findings suggest that electricity consumers in the western region excluding 
California should be largely indifferent between the three approaches to load-based 
allocation, all of which produce price drops in 2020 of roughly $2.00. Closer examination 
of the results for the two Haiku market regions that comprise this larger region suggest 
slightly greater differences in price effects between the consumption-based and the 
emissions-based approaches. In particular the consumption based approach leads to 
slightly larger price drops in the northern part of this region, which is rich in hydro 
resources as well as other types of renewables. Consumers in the southern part of this 
region fare better under an emissions based approach as coal plays a greater role in the 
generation mix there. 
4.3 Efficiency  Consequences 
The beneficial effects of load-based allocation accrue to electricity consumers 
through lower electricity prices; however, the downside of a load-based approach is that 
it yields a higher allowance price than would prevail under an auction. This effect on 
allowance price is essentially invariant with respect to the basis on which allowances are 
allocated to local distribution companies. Table 4.3-1 shows the CO2 allowance price 
under all three approaches and reveals that allowance prices are little changed across the 
three scenarios, and they each lead to significant differences in allowance price compared 
to an auction. 







15.8 16.0 16.0 
   
From a sector-specific perspective, the difference in allowance price is not 
significant, but within the broader economy it signals that greater use of resources and 
greater cost would be required to achieve emission reduction goals. Any kind of free 
allocation including grandfathering will raise the allowance price, but the load-based 
approach does so most importantly. While grandfathering is generally intended to 
compensate the owners of incumbent facilities that will be regulated by climate policy, in 
contrast, free allocation to load is a subsidy to consumers of electricity. We find it would   24
raise the price of allowances by about 12 percent compared to an auction. As a 
consequence, within a nationwide cap-and-trade program, other actors in the economy 
such as industries that use natural gas, or households that use fuels for home heating, or 
people who drive cars, would pay for this subsidy to electricity by higher prices for the 
use of energy elsewhere in the economy.  
The subsidy to electricity consumption has the effect of reducing the incentive for 
consumers to make investments in end-use efficiency. Recent analyses (McKinsey 2007, 
Nadel et al. 2004) suggest that there are substantial opportunities to improve the 
efficiency with which electricity is used in the economy. While government programs 
and standards may contribute to the realization of these efficiency gains, another 
important component is the capital purchase decisions of individuals. If electricity price 
rises less due to free allocation to electricity consumers then those consumers will have 
less incentive to purchase efficient air conditioners, refrigerators, etc., causing other 
sectors to do more work to achieve overall emission reductions. 
Electricity consumers, and the industry that supplies them with power, have a 
parochial interest in trying to lessen the impact of climate policy on prices and in 
capturing the value for the electricity sector associated with placing a scarcity value on 
CO2 in the economy. However, there is no economic logic why the value of emission 
allowances should be reserved for a sector just because it has historically been the source 
of emissions. The parochial assignment of allowance value to any one sector of the 
economy could lead to different marginal costs for emission reductions throughout the 
economy, and it could lead to some sectors having to achieve greater emission reductions 
than would be efficient overall, which offers the prospect of raising the cost from a 
nationwide perspective. 
5 Conclusion 
It is noteworthy that precisely because the cost of climate policy is large, a good 
way to achieve broad-based compensation is to reduce the overall social cost of the 
policy. Recycling revenue raised under an allowance auction to reduce preexisting taxes, 
helps achieves efficiency goals and these achievements are compounded since this 
approach reduces the overall cost of climate policy, thereby lessening the impact on 
households overall. However, it would not succeed in compensating lower income 
households who spend a larger portion of their income on energy than wealthier 
households who would benefit the most from revenue recycling. Burtraw et al. (2008) 
find that a proportional reduction in labor income taxes would be highly regressive.    25
One approach to compensating households that is embodied in current legislative 
proposals is free allocation to electricity customers, to be achieved by free allocation to 
local distribution companies. This approach seems appealing because customers may 
have relatively little opportunity to reduce electricity use in the short term, at least until 
they have the opportunity to make new capital investments in appliances, home 
weatherization, etc. 
From the national perspective, we find significant benefits for electricity 
consumers from free allocation to local distribution companies. In addition, this approach 
reconciles the important regional differences that would emerge with a grandfathering 
approach that distributed allowances for free to incumbent emitters. However, the 
benefits that emerge at the national level mask important differences across regions that 
depend on how the allocations are determined. Allocation to local distribution companies 
based on population could yield electricity prices in 2020 for populous regions with 
relatively clean sources of electricity generation that are actually below prices in the 
absence of climate policy. Consumers residing in regions that rely heavily on coal will 
tend to fare better under an approach that uses emissions to determine allocation.  
We also find free allocation to local distribution companies comes with an 
important efficiency cost, not just in a general equilibrium context stemming from 
foregone revenue but also due to the market dynamics in the regulated industries. When 
electricity customers do not see the increase in retail electricity prices, they do not have 
an incentive to reduce electricity consumption. Across the sector, this effect would lead 
to more electricity consumption, and under an economy-wide program, it would lead to 
more emissions from the electricity sector, requiring more reductions from other sectors. 
This is expected to raise the overall cost of achieving climate goals. However, the 
political virtue of this approach is that using allocation to load provides a mechanism in 
the short run to avoid sudden changes in electricity prices for consumers. Because free 
allocation to customers has the political virtue of lessening the price effect, it may 
provide for a useful transition path to phasing in a full auction in the electricity sector. 
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NEN           9.2                  10.5                   0.7                     3.9                9.2  
NES           5.4                    6.0                  (3.6)                   (0.6)               1.7  
NY           9.0                  10.0                  (2.0)                    2.9                7.1  
NJD           6.4                    7.0                  (0.6)                    1.6                5.3  
MD           8.4                    9.9                   0.8                     3.3                4.7  
PA         10.6                  12.1                   4.6                     4.6                0.8  
OHMI         10.1                  11.5                   3.4                     3.4                1.4  
MAIN           9.7                  10.6                   3.6                     3.6                3.5  












FRCC           4.1                    0.7                  (2.6)                   (2.5)              (1.1) 
AMGF           6.6                   (0.2)                  2.1                     0.3               (0.2) 
VACAR           4.8                   (0.4)                  0.0                    (1.8)               0.3  
KVWV           9.5                   (9.3)                  5.7                     2.6               (4.1) 
IN           9.2                   (7.4)                  4.8                     3.2               (3.3) 
ENTN           7.5                   (1.1)                  2.7                     1.0               (0.7) 
SPP           8.0                    0.2                   3.6                     1.5               (0.6) 
MAPP           7.9                   (1.8)                  2.7                     1.8               (0.1) 
NWP           5.5                   (0.1)                 (2.3)                   (2.7)              (0.6) 
RA           5.8                   (1.7)                 (2.9)                   (1.4)              (4.2) 
CALN           1.8                    2.6                  (9.8)                   (5.0)               2.0  
CALS           2.7                    4.1                  (7.5)                   (2.6)               3.6  
RGGI         7.6                    8.5                  (1.4)                    2.0                5.3  
Southeast         5.8                   (0.3)                  0.6                    (0.8)              (0.3) 
Midwest and Appalachia         9.9                    5.4                   4.2                     3.5                0.5  
Plains         7.1                    3.1                   2.3                     1.5                0.0  
California         2.3                    3.5                  (8.5)                   (3.6)               2.9  
Rockies and Northwest         5.7                   (0.8)                 (2.6)                   (2.2)              (2.1) 
Competitive Regions         8.5                    9.9                   1.8                     2.7                2.6  
Regulated Regions         6.1                   (1.0)                 (0.0)                   (0.6)              (0.7) 
National         7.0                    2.7                   0.6                     0.6                0.4      27


























NEN  RGGI       3,624,102                    0.13                             8.8                     1.5  
NES  RGGI     11,685,426                    0.44                             9.1                     3.8  
NY  RGGI     19,576,920                    0.35                             7.6                     2.4  
NJD  RGGI     10,905,384                    0.51                           10.4                     3.3  
MD  RGGI       6,497,626                    0.68                           10.3                     5.1  
PA  Midwest and Appalachia     12,787,354                    0.61                           13.0                   12.7  
OHMI  Midwest and Appalachia     21,998,225                    0.85                           13.2                   11.1  
MAIN  Midwest and Appalachia     22,050,673                    0.62                           13.1                     8.7  












FRCC  Southeast     22,140,641                    0.61                           12.9                     6.7  
AMGF  Southeast     19,883,364                    0.62                           17.9                   12.2  
VACAR  Southeast     22,940,469                    0.50                           16.1                     7.8  
KVWV  Midwest and Appalachia       6,976,401                    1.01                           21.6                   27.2  
IN  Midwest and Appalachia       6,627,008                    1.07                           18.0                   21.6  
ENTN  Southeast     15,470,035                    0.68                           17.0                   13.5  
SPP  Plains     12,287,603                    0.73                           18.1                   15.0  
MAPP  Plains     13,039,828                    0.69                           15.0                   12.2  
NWP  Rockies and Northwest     18,976,707                    0.34                           14.2                     6.6  
RA  Rockies and Northwest     18,902,845                    0.67                           10.7                     9.8  
CALN  California     17,379,247                    0.12                             7.8                     0.8  
CALS  California     24,827,496                    0.21                             7.5                     0.7  
RGGI     52,289,458                    0.42                             8.9                     3.2  
Southeast     80,434,509                    0.60                           15.8                     9.7  
Midwest and Appalachia     70,439,660                    0.79                           14.4                   13.2  
Plains     50,367,830                    0.67                           15.8                   11.6  
California     42,206,743                    0.16                             7.6                     0.7  
Rockies and Northwest     37,879,552                    0.48                           12.5                     8.2  
Competitive Regions   134,166,109                    0.61                           11.8                     7.5  
Regulated Regions   199,451,643                    0.61                           13.8                     9.0  
National   333,617,752                    0.61                           13.0                     8.4  
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